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ekian formulation, I reframe his argument as an extension of the 
Millian idea of ―experiments in living.‖ However, the experimental 
case for decentralization is limited in several ways. Even if decentrali-
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with the epistemic virtues of markets pointed out by Hayek. 
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It is always a disconcerting experience to read a book that proceeds 
intelligently, carefully, and in good faith to argue for a political posi-
tion significantly opposed to one‘s own. At the very least, the experi-
ence should give us pause. This is particularly fitting in the case of 
Mark Pennington‘s Robust Political Economy (2011), since one of the 
book‘s main themes is the importance of intellectual humility in poli-
tics. Pennington points out that institutions must be both designed by 
largely ignorant people, and be designed to cope with people‘s igno-
rance. This constitutes one of two main themes of the book, the 
―knowledge problem.‖ The other main theme of the book is the ―in-
centives problem‖: institutions have to be able to cope with limited 
altruism. These two themes represent, to my mind, the most plausible 
arguments for the political right. As such, Pennington‘s book should 
be recommended reading for all open-minded left-wingers. 
Nowhere are (at least self-perceived) open-minded left-
wingers more concentrated than in the field of post-Rawlsian political 
theory. In this respect it is worryingly convenient that the ―ideal 
theory‖ methodologies of political theory make the knowledge and 
incentives problems invisible. Ideally, everyone would know what 
they need to know and be motivated to act morally. Implicitly, Pen-
nington seems to grant that under such circumstances widespread 
government intervention would be desirable—although I am sure he 
would reject the very idea of abstracting from human ignorance and 
self-interest as a ludicrous and pointless endeavour. The most persua-
sive arguments for free markets and minimal states are based on the 
real world‘s departures from perfect wisdom and perfect altruism. If 
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political theorists of the left want to be relevant to actual political 
disagreements, they must engage on this terrain of non-ideal theory. 
I will engage with a crucial element of Pennington‘s non-ideal 
case for classical liberalism: his rejection of egalitarianism (and theories 
of distributive justice more generally). This is crucial to Pennington 
because, out of the four strongest challenges to classical liberalism, it is 
egalitarianism that ―continues to exert perhaps the greatest influence 
on public policy debate‖ (111). Pennington offers several arguments 
for rejecting egalitarianism, but I will focus in detail on his most 
plausible argument, which he describes as a subset of the knowledge 
problem: namely, that egalitarianism is a form of ―constructivist ra-
tionalism‖ (119). His argument is that we should design our institu-
tions to improve our understanding of justice. He aruges the institu-
tions which do this best are classical liberal ones that enable people to 
experiment with a variety of distributive principles.  
The importance of this general idea of experiments in dis-
tributive justice goes beyond its context in Pennington‘s rejection of 
egalitarianism. Pennington is right to think that political theorists have 
spent too much time advancing their own conceptions of justice, and 
not enough time thinking about how institutions shape these concep-
tions themselves. Other theorists have made epistemic arguments in 
favour of decentralization and limited government, but none that I 
know of have stressed the element of moral learning in the same way 
(Brennan 2014; DeCanio 2014; Pincione and Tesón 2006; Somin 
2013). If it could be shown that decentralized institutions were better 
at promoting knowledge of justice, this would constitute an argument 
for classical liberalism that did not depend on controversial moral 
premises about natural rights. However, as I will show, we should be 
skeptical about these claims. The experimental argument for decen-
tralization is limited, and does not point to classical liberalism in the 
way Pennington imagines. 
 I start by reconstructing Pennington‘s argument and criticiz-
ing the specifically Hayekian formulation he gives of it. The second 
section proposes that the Millian idea of ―experiments in living‖ pro-
vides a better way of framing the experimental argument for decen-
tralization, although one that is much more limited in its institutional 
implications. Having set out the potential epistemic benefits of decen-
tralization, the following section looks at the moral drawbacks a more 
decentralized system has in being less able to actually implement many 
conceptions of justice. The fourth section criticizes Pennington‘s 
equation of egalitarian redistribution with central planning. Redistri-
bution is quite compatible with decentralization justified by the epis-
temic virtues of markets (as argued for by Friedrich Hayek and oth-
ers). 
The Hayekian Argument for Decentralized Distributive 
Justice 
Pennington‘s defense of classical liberalism against egalitarianism does 
not involve a head-on critique of egalitarianism as a moral doctrine. 
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Instead, Pennington seeks to rely on the ―knowledge problem‖ to show 
that a state that attempts to pursue distributive justice will be less 
effective than one that does not. Pennington‘s argument has two 
premises. First, given our lack of knowledge about distributive justice, 
we should design institutions to improve this knowledge. Second, 
institutions that decentralize responsibility for distributive justice are 
better at improving our moral knowledge than institutions that allow 
distributive justice to be pursued centrally by government. I will begin 
with some brief comments on Pennington‘s first premise, with which I 
am largely sympathetic. I will then point out the weaknesses of the 
Hayekian argument Pennington gives for the second premise. 
According to Pennington, taking seriously the limitations of 
our moral knowledge implies that we: 
must consider what sort of institutional arrangements facilitate the 
evolution and communication of the appropriate moral principles. At-
tention should, in other words, shift from a preoccupation with “static” 
or “end-state” theories to ones which focus on the dynamic processes 
within which principles of justice may be discovered and disseminated. 
(121) 
So long as we are uncertain about justice, we cannot directly proceed 
from advancing a set of moral criteria by which society should be 
judged to recommending the set of institutions or policies that will be 
optimal according to those criteria. Rather, we should plan our institu-
tions so that our knowledge about the criteria for judging those institu-
tions itself tends to improve over time.  
On this important point I fully agree with Pennington. He us-
es this idea to criticize the kind of political theory practiced by John 
Rawls and Ronald Dworkin, which proceeds directly from moral 
philosophy to institutional design. This critique of the philosopher-
legislator is reminiscent of Jeremy Waldron‘s (1999) complaint that 
contemporary political theorists have spent too much time setting out 
their own conceptions of justice and not enough time thinking about 
the processes by which society should choose between competing 
conceptions of justice. However, whereas Waldron is more concerned 
with fair ways of resolving disagreement, Pennington‘s response is 
closer to that of epistemic democrats such as David Estlund (2009), 
who are more concerned with how institutions can be designed to 
better track the truth (whatever that might be). 
Pennington argues that the institutions that will best promote 
learning about distributive justice are those that forbid states from 
actually pursuing distributive justice in practice. He advocates 
an “open society” that allows different individuals and groups to enter 
and exit from a variety of cross-cutting arrangements provided by fam-
ilies, firms, neighbourhood associations and the panoply of cultural 
and civil institutions that distribute money, goods and social status. 
The processes of interpersonal and intercultural learning and adjust-
ment that would occur in such a framework, though offering no guar-
antees that the “right” principles might be discovered, would nonethe-
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less increase the chance that any person or group picked out at random 
would have the opportunity to find the “right” set of distributional 
rules. (127) 
The argument Pennington gives for thinking a radically decentral-
ized system will improve learning about distributive justice is a Hay-
ekian one. He seeks to establish an analogy between Hayek‘s argument 
for the market and his own argument for decentralized distributive 
justice. This analogy has two parts: first, that knowledge of justice is 
relevantly similar to economic knowledge in terms of complexity, 
dispersion and particularity; second, that knowledge about distributive 
justice can be communicated by price signals in the same way as eco-
nomic knowledge. Unfortunately for Pennington, both these aspects 
of the analogy fail, as I will explain 
Pennington seeks to establish an analogy between knowledge 
of justice and the kinds of knowledge that motivated Hayek‘s argu-
ment for the market. For Hayek, the production and allocation of all 
the goods in the economy is simply so complex no individual could 
possibly comprehend all the information at once. Instead, knowledge 
about production plans and consumption preferences are dispersed 
throughout the population. Moreover, much economic knowledge 
takes the form of tacit know-how that cannot be verbally communicat-
ed to others. The best economic institutions will accordingly be those 
that allow decisions to be made in a dispersed way by those who know 
best, rather than attempting to make all decisions centrally. Penning-
ton tries to apply the same logic to distributive justice: ―the knowledge 
pertinent to appropriate principles of distribution cannot be central-
ized in a public forum and the complexity of the factors that contribute 
to the formulation of distributional rules cannot be grasped by a group 
of minds engaged in a deliberative exercise‖ (126). 
Pennington‘s analogy fails here because knowledge about jus-
tice and economic knowledge are relevantly different. Distributive 
principles like ―maximise aggregate welfare‖ or ―maximise the primary 
goods of the least advantaged‖ are not necessarily complex at all. Eco-
nomic knowledge involves (often tacit) knowledge of particulars, 
whereas knowledge of distributive justice (at least in the work of 
philosophers like Rawls, Dworkin and Robert Nozick) is the 
knowledge of general rules. In his classic article on the subject, Hayek 
suggested that the element of particularity in economic knowledge was 
crucial to the epistemic case for markets: ―If it is today so widely 
assumed that the latter [central planning] will be in a better position 
[than the market], this is because one kind of knowledge, namely, 
scientific knowledge, occupies now so prominent a place in public 
imagination that we tend to forget that it is not the only kind that is 
relevant‖ (Hayek [1945] 1949: 80). The implication seems to be that 
general rules are not subject to the epistemic case for the market.  
If distributive principles are simple and general in the way en-
visioned by Rawls, Dworkin, Nozick and others, they can be ―central-
ized‖ in the mind of a single individual without loss. They are thus 
immune to the Hayekian critique of ―central planning‖ that Pennington 
seeks to apply to them. This should not be taken to imply a more 
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general rejection of the epistemic argument for the market in the 
context in that Hayek originally made it. Even if distributive principles 
themselves are simple and general, knowledge of how to best follow 
distributive rules is complex, dispersed and tacit precisely because it 
also requires economic knowledge. For this reason, the best way to 
fulfill a principle like utilitarianism or the difference principle may 
well involve markets. Hayek‘s argument for the market can be read as 
a form of indirect utilitarianism along these lines. I am not disputing 
epistemic arguments for markets in general (I will return to this sub-
ject below in the fourth section). My point is that it does not work in 
the specific case of knowledge about distributive principles. 
The second element in Pennington‘s analogy with Hayek con-
cerns the role of competition and inequality in signalling. For Hayek, 
profits and losses inform entrepreneurs which business models are 
most socially useful and so should either be emulated or avoided. 
Pennington thinks a similar process of signalling will take place with 
distributive norms:  
It is differences in results - that is, inequalities - that enable decen-
tralized agents to learn about the merits and demerits of alternatives, 
and for these results to be disseminated across the overlapping perspec-
tives of countless actors none of whom may be aware, individually or 
collectively, how their particular choices contribute to the evolution of 
distributional norms (126). 
This analogy between product markets and competing distributive 
norms is puzzling. There is no reason to think that material inequalities 
between communities will be a good signal of the merits and demerits 
of different distributive norms, unless we simply assume that prosperi-
ty is the correct moral criterion. Pennington rejects the idea (which he 
attributes to Dworkin) that all relevant goods should be denominated 
in money prices, and stresses the importance of other forms of compe-
tition, such as competitive federalism. However, he maintains that 
competition and unequal results provide useful signals to others about 
the normative validity of distributive principles, and this is problemat-
ic.  
Elsewhere in the book, Pennington explains his evolutionary ap-
proach to economics as an alternative to neoclassical general equilibri-
um analysis. He considers the worry that the survival of the fittest is 
normatively uninteresting unless there is some reason to think that 
―fitness‖ is normatively valuable in a particular context. In the case of 
the market, the ―selection criterion‖ of fitness is the ―account of profit 
and loss,‖ which is determined by firms‘ responsiveness to consumer 
choices (43). The discipline of the market is thus normatively defensi-
ble ultimately because it tends towards the efficient satisfaction of 
consumer preferences. While this response may be satisfactory as a 
defense of commodity markets, it will not do at all as a defense of 
radically decentralizing distributive justice. Consumer sovereignty is 
not the right kind of determinant for the success of moral principles. 
The point of a principle of justice is not to efficiently satisfy consumer 
preferences, but to do the morally correct thing.  
Michael Bennett 
6 
 
Estlund (2009, 177) helpfully presents Hayek‘s epistemic ap-
proach to the market as a case in which the answer to one question 
(what is the efficient allocation of resources?) is provided by entrepre-
neurs separately answering a different one (what will maximize my 
own profits?). However, as Estlund points out, this sort of indirect 
question-answering is surely the exception rather than the rule. Em-
ploying this kind of indirect method to get at the truth requires a 
special justification. Hayek‘s epistemic argument for the market can be 
seen as such a justification, because he stresses the role of tacit, dis-
persed knowledge and because he implicitly assumes that the criterion 
for economic success is the efficient satisfaction of consumer prefer-
ences. However, when the criterion for success is itself the thing we 
want to discover, there is no reason to think this particular justification 
for markets applies. 
Pennington‘s Hayekian argument that decentralization pro-
motes knowledge of justice fails. However, the goal of promoting 
knowledge by means of institutional design remains a valid one. And 
even if Hayekian competition does not work, there might be other 
mechanisms by which decentralization can promote moral knowledge. 
In the next section, I will explore these possibilities. 
A Millian Argument for Decentralized Distributive Justice 
The most promising source from the liberal tradition for thinking 
about decentralization and moral learning is not Hayek but John Stuart 
Mill. In this section I will consider whether the Millian idea of ―exper-
iments in living‖ provides an epistemic reason to decentralize distribu-
tive justice. Rather than trying to be faithful to Mill‘s text, I will 
follow Ryan Muldoon (2015) in seeing how far the idea of experi-
ments in living can be extended for use in contemporary political 
philosophy. I will start by outlining a Millian argument for decentrali-
zation before considering two problems with the argument: an objec-
tion from moral epistemology and an ―incentives problem‖ of the kind 
familiar from other parts of Pennington‘s book. In the following 
section, I will consider a deeper problem with the approach, which is 
that it requires some people to accept unjust institutions in the medi-
um term as part of the experiment. 
The idea behind experiments in living is that trying out differ-
ent modes of life improves our knowledge about how to live. Applied 
specifically to distributive justice, the idea would be that experiment-
ing with different distributive principles would improve our 
knowledge about what justice requires. It is important to distinguish 
the concept of experimentation used here from the concept of exper-
imentation Hayek applies to entrepreneurship. In the Hayekian 
framework I considered in the previous section, the idea of experi-
mentation is bound up with the idea of competition. Entrepreneurs are 
imagined as experimenting with different products, with the account 
of profit and loss providing the results. In the ordinary scientific usage 
of ―experiment,‖ however, there is no necessary connection with 
competition, and the same is true of Millian experiments in living. 
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Individuals and communities experimenting with different modes of 
life are no more in competition with one another than sets of siblings 
are in competition with one another over the best ways to care for 
elderly parents. A successful experiment by one party is in no way 
unwelcome to other parties. Experimenters interact through emula-
tion, but the pressure to emulate success is nothing but the internal 
desire to do the best oneself. It is quite different from the external 
necessity of keeping up with best practice to avoid bankruptcy, which 
is enforced by competitive markets. A successful experiment is a pure 
positive externality for those who learn by observing it.  
If the link between experimentation and decentralization has 
nothing to do with competition, why would we expect a more decen-
tralized political system to better facilitate experiments? Pragmatist 
political theorists argue that successive governments in a unitary 
political system can be viewed as different ―experiments‖ from which 
we learn each time (Anderson 2006; Gerlsbeck 2016; Knight and 
Johnson 2011). However, the advantage of decentralization (seeming-
ly missed by these pragmatists but pointed out by Pennington) lies in 
being able to run several different experiments simultaneously. This 
creates many more data-points than would be possible by running 
experiments sequentially in a centralized system, and permits them to 
be compared more systematically. Running more experiments creates 
a bigger and thus more reliable body of evidence from which to draw 
conclusions.  
What are the institutional implications of this argument for 
decentralization? Because Millian experiments have no connection 
with markets, we should not assume that ―decentralizing‖ justice on 
this basis will take the radical form of marketization that it has in 
Pennington‘s Hayekian argument. Muldoon suggests the Millian 
argument implies some presumption in favor of individual liberty 
against the authority of the democratic state. However, this is not the 
only institutional way of decentralizing the pursuit of justice. An 
alternative approach is Keynes‘s (1933) suggestion that different 
countries should experiment with different institutions. Differences 
between countries are welcome, we might say, because those differ-
ences allow us to learn something about the different values that those 
countries‘ institutions are oriented around. Pennington expresses 
support for the idea that countries should experiment with different 
development strategies (216). However, the Keynesian approach is 
sharply distinguished from the inter-jurisdictional competition that 
Pennington also favors (59). Unlike efficiency-based arguments for 
competitive federalism (Tiebout 1956), the experimental argument 
for political decentralization is not necessarily tied up with the unre-
stricted freedom to enter and exit different communities. Free move-
ment of people might be epistemically beneficial if voluntary partici-
pants in experiments are more enthusiastic and so provide a better 
guide to the desirability of a society guided by a particular principle of 
justice. But if we want to be genuinely impartial about which princi-
ples of justice are worth exploring, the logic of the argument leads to 
Michael Bennett 
8 
 
the conclusion we cannot rule out experimenting with illiberal princi-
ples of justice which would deny individuals the right to exit. 
I will now consider a potential problem with the moral epis-
temology that is implicit in the Millian argument. The benefits of 
experimentation are relatively obvious for questions of instrumental 
reason. For example, being able to observe countries governed by a 
variety of different economic institutions is very helpful for deciding 
which institutions will do best by a criterion such as aggregate welfare 
or distributive equality. The idea of using real-world experiments to 
settle non-instrumental questions is a little more contentious. Mill‘s 
own text is unclear as to whether he thought experiments in living 
would shed light on the best way to realize abstract goods of human 
flourishing that we already think are valuable, or whether experiments 
could also help us discover which abstract goods are valuable in the 
first place. (Keynes is similarly unclear). In contemporary philosophi-
cal parlance, the question is whether experiments improve knowledge 
only of conceptions of the good, or also of conceptions of the right 
(justice). It is the latter kind of knowledge that is necessary for the 
argument for decentralization considered here. 
The epistemology of learning about the nature of justice 
through real-world experiments is controversial. One way of defend-
ing the Millian argument would be to simply reject the common idea 
that normative principles must be ultimately independent of empirical 
facts (Cohen 2008, ch. 6; Miller 2008). However, such a move might 
not be necessary. Knowing certain facts about the world may be 
epistemically useful for discovering moral principles, without it being 
that case that the truth of the principles logically depends on those 
facts. Marc Stears (2005, 333–35) raises this point in his discussion of 
G. A. Cohen‘s fact-insensitivity thesis. That normative justification is 
ultimately grounded on fact-insensitive principles does not mean that 
our knowledge of those principles is similarly independent of empirical 
facts. Muldoon makes a similar point in raising the distinction between 
―discovery‖ and ―justification‖: ―How one comes up with a new idea is 
entirely separate from whether that idea can be justified‖ (10).  
By what mechanism might this work in practice? One possibil-
ity is that experiments sharpen our intuitions. If our judgments are 
more likely to be correct when we consider actual moral dilemmas 
rather than mere thought experiments, this would be a reason to want 
more actual experiments in the world. Muldoon seems to pointing to a 
different possibility, however: that experiments will be useful in 
prompting people to ask new moral questions and adduce new kinds of 
reasons as moral ―evidence.‖ Some mechanism of this kind will have to 
operate if experiments in distributive justice are to be informative. 
Assuming that some mechanism for moral learning by exper-
iment exists, it will surely be much less efficacious than experiments in 
science or business, for two reasons. First, experimentation in justice 
will necessarily be a much slower process than consumers experiment-
ing with different products in markets. Consumers can try out a range 
of different products at once, and they can even try them out side by 
side. A reliable experiment on a principle of justice, on the other 
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hand, requires a body of participants who will sincerely commit them-
selves to the relevant way of life over the long run. Only then will we 
get an idea of what a community run by such a principle would look 
like. Second, observing and emulating other ways of life is much more 
difficult than producers observing and emulating alternative produc-
tion techniques. Only participants themselves get a full idea of what 
living under a society ordered by a particular principle of justice feels 
like, because truly understanding a norm requires actually following it 
and making it a constitutive part of one‘s own identity. Observing 
communities structured by alternative moral norms may offer some 
provocation to change our moral beliefs. More often, however, we 
will simply apply our existing moral beliefs when we look at other 
communities. Thus, even if the moral-epistemology problem with 
experiments in distributive justice can be surmounted, the case for 
decentralization that emerges is weak. 
The second major problem with the experimental argument 
for decentralization concerns its robustness in circumstances of limited 
altruism. If we grant that political decentralization makes institutions 
more robust to the knowledge problem, Pennington‘s avowed pro-
gram also entails analyzing how robust these institutions are to the 
incentives problem. Millian experiments in distributive justice are not 
at all robust in this respect, because personal prudential incentives run 
directly counter to the interests of the system. Experiments in living 
are robust to limited altruism when it comes to conceptions of the 
good (the choice of a religious or an artistic life, for example) because 
if experimenters discover new and valuable ways of life, most of the 
prudential benefits of this are internalized by individuals themselves. 
However, , if experiments improve our knowledge of justice, the 
prudential benefits of this are almost entirely external to the experi-
menters. Faced with a choice of communities following different 
distributive principles, many people will choose not the community 
whose rules they judge to be most just, but the community whose 
rules favor their own self-interest. Thus, Wilt Chamberlain is likely to 
be strongly tempted by a Nozickian community, whereas the person 
with congenital health defects is likely to be tempted by a Dworkinian 
community. Moreover, as soon as some people become start behaving 
in this way, others are likely to follow suit, because willingness to 
incur sacrifices for the sake of justice is often conditional on a percep-
tion that other people are doing the same. Whereas the Hayekian 
version of experimentation works along the grain of prudential incen-
tives, Millian experiments in distributive justice work against it, 
requiring people to be independently motivated to search for the truth 
about justice even at cost to themselves.  
One way of dealing with these incentive problems would be 
to restrict freedom of movement between communities experimenting 
with different norms. At the extreme, simply forbidding movement 
would remove the possibility of choosing distributive communities for 
self-interested rather than moral reasons. Setting this aside as unac-
ceptably illiberal, we can pick out large-scale movement of capital as a 
particular target for restriction. Whereas the movement of individuals 
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and their modest holdings are plausibly driven by the search for a 
morally superior living environment, movements of large fortunes 
tend to be driven by self-interest. As Keynes pointed out, the free 
movement of capital tends to be a force for international homogeneity, 
limiting the scope for diverse distributive experiments.  
Pennington agrees that, on the consumption side, free trade 
reduces international diversity while increasing intranational diversity. 
However, he also claims that free trade has not promoted cultural 
homogeneity on the production side, because it allows countries to 
develop comparative advantages in sets of norms that are suited to 
different products (Japanese-style teamwork for car manufacturing, 
Chinese-style entrepreneurship for fashion) (213–14). This seems 
doubtful to me, but it merits empirical investigation. Pending this, we 
can say that to the extent that free movement of capital is a force for 
homogeneity, the experimentation argument provides reasons for 
measures such as capital controls and withholding taxes, which mini-
mize the extent to which investment flows are driven by differences in 
regulatory environments (Avi-Yonah 2000). Once we tackle the 
incentives problems with experiments in distributive justice, the kind 
of decentralization that this argument justifies is very different from 
the one Pennington envisages. 
The Moral Costs of Decentralization  
The previous section argued that decentralization had some tendency 
to advance knowledge about justice, but that this advantage is likely to 
be quite weak. However, something is better than nothing. Unless the 
decentralization proposal carries other costs, it will still be worth 
pursuing. This section will focus on one such cost: that, according to 
many conceptions of justice, decentralization stands in the way of the 
policies that would promote justice. That is, institutions that improve 
knowledge can also impede the ability to act on that knowledge. Once 
we take account of these costs, the moral impact of decentralization 
may be net negative. 
Knowledge and implementation can come into conflict in sev-
eral ways. King Solomon‘s proposal to cut the baby in half was a good 
way of finding out who should have been given custody; but if actually 
implemented, it would also have rendered that knowledge useless. 
The economics of search theory illustrate a related dilemma: How 
much money should you spend trying to acquire valuable empirical 
private information that you know in principle to exist? Tradeoffs 
between knowledge and implementation become even trickier when 
the knowledge involved is moral rather than empirical in nature, or 
when it involves acquiring new concepts rather than acquiring new 
data-points of a familiar kind (on this distinction see Fearon 1998, 49–
52).  
The task of deciding what criteria should be applied to oneself 
has a reflexive element, because the resources spent on reflection 
about what criteria to apply might themselves be judged to be too 
large or too small. However, this reflexivity is not particularly compli-
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cated or problematic, and it is a phenomenon we are very familiar 
with in the case of individuals. Consider someone deciding what their 
goals should be for the day, in a case where there are better or worse 
answers to the question. The more time they spend thinking about the 
choice, the more likely they are to get a good answer. However, if 
they spend all day asking what they should do, they will have no time 
left to actually do it. So (much of) their time spent thinking will be 
wasteful, according to the criterion decided on by that thinking itself. 
It is clear that the two extremes of all thought, no action and all ac-
tion, no thought are both unlikely to produce good outcomes. How-
ever, when knowledge is moral and conceptual in nature, I cannot 
imagine how the decision to stop thinking and start acting could be 
anything other than a matter of contextual practical wisdom that 
cannot be codified. 
The tradeoff between knowledge and action that is familiar for 
individuals also applies to institutions. Principles of justice are the 
criteria by which institutions are evaluated; but, as Pennington points 
out, institutions can also affect our knowledge of these principles. One 
obvious way this tradeoff arises in institutional design is in considering 
how much time and resources should be devoted to democratic delib-
eration. Would the epistemic benefits of paying all citizens to skip 
work for a ―deliberation day‖ before elections (Ackerman and Fishkin 
2002) exceed the economic costs? Insofar as the experimental argu-
ment for decentralization succeeds, the optimal extent of political 
decentralization is another case of a tradeoff between knowledge and 
implementation.  
To see this, consider a choice between two institutional sys-
tems: a conventional unitary democracy versus the decentralized classi-
cal liberal system proposed by Pennington, in which the state is re-
stricted to enforcing property rights. Suppose, on the basis of the 
argument in the previous section, that the classical liberal system is 
epistemically superior; people in the classical liberal system tend to 
have more accurate beliefs about justice. Now consider two possibili-
ties. First, it might be the case that the correct conception of justice is, 
in fact, a libertarian one. In this case, all is well for the classical liberal 
system; it is better at discovering the truth about justice, and moreo-
ver it has, in effect, already implemented it. Second, consider the 
possibility that the correct conception of justice is some form of dis-
tributive egalitarianism. In this case, by assumption, people in the 
classical liberal system are more likely to come to favor egalitarianism 
than people in the conventional unitary democracy because they can 
experimentally see egalitarianism in action. However, implementing 
the egalitarian principle of distributive justice will be much more 
difficult in the classical liberal system than in the conventional unitary 
democracy. The democracy requires only a majority to implement a 
distributive principle. The classical liberal system, in effect, requires 
unanimity. Indeed, exactly the same issue will arise for any principle of 
justice other than a libertarian one. Except in the special case of liber-
tarianism, the classical liberal system is much worse at implementing 
principles of justice, even if it is better at discovering them.  
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If the classical liberal system is unable to implement non-
libertarian society-wide principles (such as egalitarianism), it is also 
questionable how far it is actually able to experiment with such princi-
ples in the first place. In the classical liberal system, it is possible to 
experiment with egalitarianism and other principles at a smallscale. 
However, the knowledge gleaned from observing such small-scale 
experiments may be of only limited relevance for considering the 
merits of applying the same principles at a much larger scale. 
When Pennington asks ―what the requirements for a genuinely 
‗impartial‘ choice of social institutions might be‖ (127), he makes no 
mention of this problem. Yet the classical liberal system he favors is 
not actually impartial between different conceptions of justice. Classi-
cal liberalism appears to offer impartial terms to all distributive views 
because it enables any group of people to form their own distributive 
community. However, this sort of impartiality will only really satisfy 
libertarians (who are happy that the system as a whole respects owner-
ship rights) and cultural relativists (who only wish to apply their 
principles in their own immediate neighbourhood). Impartiality of this 
sort does not take seriously theories such as those of Rawls, Dworkin, 
and Iris Marion Young-theories to which Pennington pays a great deal 
of attention, but which apply to society as a whole. Rawls, Dworkin, 
or Young would not be satisfied by the thought that their own com-
munities were just if those communities were merely islands in a 
larger sea of injustice. These theories are intended to describe the 
demands justice makes on everyone, not merely the demands it makes 
on those agree with the theory.  
That Pennington regards contrary conceptions of justice as 
merely private preferences is indicated by his statement that 
even in the case of what are more explicitly moral questions, reliance 
on the exit principle may be preferable. Those who find themselves in 
the minority on whichever side of the abortion debate, for example, 
may find it better to live under a regime of interjurisdictional compe-
tition where they have at least some scope to live under an authority 
that reflects their own point of view, rather than face a unitary system 
of moral laws. (76)  
Pennington seems to assume that moral beliefs are desires to live in 
particular kinds of communities rather than imperatives to make the 
world a certain way. To favor interjurisdictional competition and open 
borders is effectively to privilege the pro-choice side of the debate, 
since it means that women even in the pro-life jurisdiction can always 
receive an abortion if they are willing and able to pay the costs of exit. 
At the same time, interjurisdictional competition does not fully ad-
dress the concerns of feminists, who do not just want access to abor-
tions themselves, but want women everywhere to have access without 
having to pay those exit costs. A liberal approach to abortion may well 
be justified on directly moral grounds. But classical liberalism cannot 
avoid taking a stance on abortion as a moral issue once we recognize 
that it is indeed a moral issue rather than merely a matter of personal 
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preference. The same applies to wider moral issues, such as questions 
of distributive justice. 
A genuinely impartial mechanism for institutional choice must 
be one that confers no substantive advantages or disadvantages on any 
particular conceptions of justice (within some suitably wide boundary 
of reasonableness or tolerability [cf. 128] ). Democracy is just such a 
mechanism, because it can implement any distributive rule, including a 
libertarian one.  
In saying that, I have no desire to reject the entirety of public 
choice theory and its associated critique of democracy. Public choice 
theory can help to identify biases in political systems while remaining 
impartial between different conceptions of justice. As far as possible, 
political systems should be designed to counter these biases. The 
problem of rational ignorance, which Pennington emphasizes (61–69), 
is a good example of this, and is worth briefly dwelling on (see also 
Caplan 2011 and Somin 2013).  
The theory of rational ignorance holds that voters in large 
electorates, recognizing the meager odds that their votes will (individ-
ually) tip the balance in an election, decide to underinform themselves 
about politics and government, since becoming well informed would 
almost certainly be a waste of time and energy. Let us assume that this 
is a genuine problem. It may just be a problem we have to live with if 
we cannot come up with any impartial alternatives. This point is 
structurally similar to Pennington‘s complaint that certain so-called 
market failures are not really failures at all if no alternative institutions 
would be able to perform better (22–40). It may be that we face a 
trade-off between market systems, in which citizens are well-informed 
but selfish, and voting systems, in which citizens are morally motivat-
ed but poorly informed. The low probability of making a difference 
which makes it rational for voters to be ignorant, also makes it rational 
for them to vote in a moral rather than a selfish way, since doing so 
costs them nothing. 
Less pessimistically, there might be institutional innovations 
that avoid this trade-off without abandoning the basic principle of 
democratic sovereignty. One proposal, advanced by Claudio López-
Guerra (2011) and others, is to make greater use of lotteries rather 
than elections to select decision makers (Guerrero 2014; Landemore 
2013, 108–17). A lottery could be used to select members of an upper 
house of parliament, or to narrow the franchise for parliamentary 
elections. With a small group of randomly selected voters, it would be 
financially feasible for them to undergo some sort of educative deliber-
ative process before casting their votes. Reducing the size of the deci-
sion-making body would also change the incentives that create the 
rational-ignorance problem. Individual votes in a smaller body would 
have a much greater chance of altering the outcome, thus increasing 
the incentive to acquire and rationally process information about the 
decision. At the same time, increasing the efficacy of individual votes 
would be unlikely to raise the alternative problem of selfishness. 
Because they lack any common social features, lottery-selected deci-
sion-makers would only be able to enrich themselves by increasing the 
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perks of their own specific offices. Such nakedly venal conduct would 
encounter resistance from the consciences of the decision-makers 
themselves, the opprobrium of their fellow citizens, and (if necessary) 
constitutional provisions enforced by another branch of government. 
I am not suggesting that democratic innovations like these can 
remedy all the problems with democracy to which Pennington and 
others have pointed. I fully agree that citizens should be aware of the 
knowledge and incentive problems with democracy, and should ac-
cordingly exercise restraint and humility in directing the state to 
intervene in social life. This may well entail that democratic states 
choose to leave many areas of life up to markets and private initiative. 
In the next section, I will argue that this sort of humility is nonetheless 
quite compatible with a strongly redistributive state. 
The Possibility of a Liberal Egalitarianism 
So far, I have argued that the negative argument Pennington makes 
against state distributive justice is unsuccessful. In this section, I would 
like to allay some fears about distributive justice and its compatibility 
with the epistemic merits for which classical liberals such as Hayek 
have prized markets. Part of Pennington‘s rejection of distributive 
justice seems to be based on viewing redistribution as a form of central 
planning, but there is no necessary connection between the two. 
One argument Pennington repeatedly uses against govern-
ment intervention is that even if free markets are producing subopti-
mal results, there is no reason to think government will have the 
knowledge necessary to adjust markets in the precise way necessary to 
produce optimal results. This argument is invoked against interven-
tions to remedy information externalities and lock-ins (33, 37), to 
provide public goods in health and education (167), to deal with 
environmental externalities (229, 241), and to promote distributive 
justice (133–34). This reasoning involves the same kind of mistake 
Pennington describes as the ―nirvana fallacy‖ earlier in the book (24). 
The nirvana fallacy is to take the inability of markets to achieve perfect 
Pareto optimality as a reason for states to intervene, without consider-
ing whether state interventions might actually make things worse. 
Similarly, Pennington complains that state intervention fails to achieve 
optimal results without allowing that suboptimal intervention might 
nonetheless be better than no intervention at all. Governments do not 
need to hit the perfect optimum of distributive justice or efficiency; 
they just need to make things more just or efficient than unconstrained 
markets would. We don‘t need to know what the ideal level of public 
spending on roads would be in order to say that some public roads 
would be better than none public roads at all (cf. Sen 2006). Clearly, 
beliefs about which direction to adjust in—more roads or or less?—
implies beliefs about where the optimum level is not; but it is compati-
ble with considerable uncertainty about where precisely the optimum 
is. Just because concerted public action will not hit the optimum, it 
does not follow that public action is unable to approximate towards 
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it—at least compared with leaving things completely up to an uncon-
strained market.  
Pennington‘s application of this nirvana fallacy to distributive 
justice in particular shows an ironic distrust of markets and spontane-
ous orders. He writes that  
to suggest that a particular decision increases or decreases social jus-
tice,the relevant actor, whether a private individual (through a chari-
table action)or a government department (through tax and spending 
decisions) would need answers to the following kinds of questions, 
among many others. Will the recipients of transfer payments engage in 
activities and spend the relevant money in ways that increase or de-
crease their earning power in the labour market? To what extent might 
transfer recipients spend on a consumption bundle which increases the 
demand for unskilled labour, and thus reduces income inequality rela-
tive to spending, that raises the demand for already higher-paid occu-
pations and thus may increase inequality? [The list goes on.] (134) 
If we really believe in the virtues of markets, we don‘t need to answer 
all these questions; we simply trust that the market will make the 
necessary adjustments. If recipients of redistribution choose to use it 
to work less or to consume particular goods, then if we really believe 
individuals have a better idea of their own interests than experts do, 
why should we complain? Pennington‘s general case for the market, 
with which I sympathize, is that is robust: a decentralized network is 
much better at adapting to external shocks than a centralized hierar-
chy. It thus seems odd that Pennington thinks that markets are so 
fragile when confronted with state intervention. This is not to deny 
that there are debates about tax neutrality and about the relative 
merits of income, wealth, inheritance, and consumption taxes. How-
ever, this debate is relatively trivial and academic compared to the 
broad sweep of Pennington‘s concerns. Each of these taxes, applied 
generally, leave investment, production and consumption decisions in 
the hands of the market rather than the state.  
Redistribution is not central planning, and it does not require 
the kind of homogenous agreement on ends that Pennington finds so 
troubling. Once we distinguish between the right (how resources and 
opportunities should be distributed) and the good (what people should 
do with them), we can demand that society follows certain principles 
of right while leaving questions of the good up to individuals. Penning-
ton‘s concern for toleration and allowing others to pursue different 
ends of their own choosing (91) is fully compatible with a liberal 
egalitarianism. Redistribution need not reduce the net amount of 
individual freedom in society. Instead, it merely shifts around the 
freedom that property confers (Cohen 1994, 14–16). Moreover, it 
can do so in a predictable, rule-bound way that avoids the pathologies 
of arbitrary rule that so concerned Hayek. Most redistribution in 
contemporary welfare states takes place through in-kind or conditional 
benefits. However, if in-kind or conditional benefits are judged to be 
problematic for knowledge or incentive reasons, redistribution can 
always take place instead through cash, either upfront as a stakeholder 
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grant, or at regular intervals as a basic income (Meade 1964; Van 
Parijs 1997). Redistribution, in other words, can take place in a free-
market society. 
   
I wish to conclude by pointing out the limits of my critique, and asking 
where it leaves Pennington‘s argument for classical liberalism.  
My critique is tempered in two ways. First, I have shown not 
that there is no knowledge-based reason for political decentralization, 
but that the case for it is much weaker than Pennington supposes. The 
epistemic benefits of political decentralization for distributive justice 
must be balanced against the disadvantages political decentralization 
has for the implementation of almost all distributive principles. On 
balance, the case for decentralization is probably quite weak, especially 
at the intrastate level. In practice, its implication is probably a consid-
eration in favor of countries or federal jurisdictions being free to 
pursue different internal distributive policies. (Note that this also does 
not preclude the possibility of redistribution at the interjurisdictional 
level.) 
Second, I have not addressed incentives arguments against re-
distribution. However, it is important to stress that incentives argu-
ments against redistributive policies are quite distinct from incentives 
arguments against distributive moral positions. Only the former are 
logically coherent. Regarding the latter, it makes no sense to say that 
what is untenable from the perspective of institutional robustness, 
therefore, is not the case for “common ownership” in the sense of a 
structure designed to fulfill a particular production or conservation 
goal, but the view that resources as a whole should be treated as the 
“common assets of humanity” with all people, by the mere fact of their 
existence, granted an equal right to a particular share. (143) 
A distributive ―view‖ in this sense is a moral principle, and it is a 
category mistake to think that a moral principle can be defeated by an 
empirical fact (Cohen 2008, ch. 5). A moral principle such as Rawls‘s 
difference principle defines a criterion of moral success (maximizing 
the goods of the least advantaged). One might say that given the empir-
ical fact that redistribution reduces economic growth (let us suppose), 
the best way of fulfilling the difference principle is to enact a policy 
allowing people to claim private property in unowned land (for exam-
ple). The empirical question would be whether this policy will help to 
fulfill the difference principle. No answer to this question, however, 
can affect the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the principle itself. Reject-
ing exaggerated versions of ideal theorizing does not entail rejecting 
the distinction between means and ends. Theories of justice aim to 
provide an end against which policies can be evaluated. A realistic 
theory of justice will make whatever concessions to reality are neces-
sary to enable policies to be adopted that fulfill the posited end. Thus, 
the point of the difference principle is to allow for the fact that, due to 
incentive effects, maximizing the resources of the worst off may 
require allowing inequality. Rawls thus shields his theory from being 
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insensitive to empirical realities, even though no such reality can be 
adduced to defeat the justice of the difference principle. 
Where does all this leave Pennington‘s argument for rejecting 
the egalitarian challenge to classical liberalism? As I see it, three roads 
are open to him, depending on where he wants to go.  
First, it might be that Pennington‘s rejection of egalitarianism 
is not really driven by non-ideal considerations about knowledge and 
incentives, but instead by a substantial moral commitment to a liber-
tarian conception of justice. Pennington‘s periodic emphasis on the 
necessity of unanimity points in this direction. For example, he writes 
that ―people may wish to make them [trade-offs] differently, and when 
their values conflict it is doubtful that an agreed blueprint can be found 
to determine how much inequality is acceptable and how ‗social‘ 
decisions should be made‖ (131). The assumption that decisions must 
be made unanimously points to a prior moral belief that each individu-
al has a natural right to refuse to cooperate.  
Another deep source of Pennington‘s rejection of distributive 
justice might be a thoroughgoing moral skepticism. An interpretation 
along these lines is suggested by the quoted passage on abortion, and 
by Pennington‘s use of scare quotes around the word right. If Penning-
ton replied to my argument by simply denying that there is any such 
thing as justice or morality, this would certainly cut the legs out from 
under my critique. However, the fact that he argues that decentraliza-
tion facilitates moral learning implies he believes there is something 
real to learn about. Moreover, if one were to adopt a radically skepti-
cal stance, it is unclear to me on what grounds one could make any 
institutional recommendations at all, decentralized or otherwise. This, 
however, takes us into much deeper philosophical waters than I need 
to paddle in today. 
The final road Pennington could take would be to abandon his 
resistance to egalitarianism and other theories of distributive justice. 
This would leave him able to continue raising incentives-based objec-
tions to redistributive policies insofar as they are supported by empiri-
cal evidence. It would place him in the company of ―bleeding-heart 
libertarians‖ who combine hostility to the administrative or regulatory 
state with sympathy for the social-insurance or welfare state (Brennan 
2012).  
This road would be truer to the spirit of robust political econ-
omy: thinking about how the world can be improved given the deep 
importance of knowledge and incentive problems. At the very least, 
robust political economy may be agnostic about distributive justice, 
but it should not be atheist about it. 
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